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Chapter 14
Ars experimentandi et conjectandi. Laws 
of Nature, Material Objects 
and Contingent Circumstances
Enrico Pasini
The scattered and pervasive variability of material objects, being a conspicuous part 
of the very experience of Early-Modern and Modern science, challenges its purely 
theoretic character in many ways. Problems of this kind turn out in such different 
scientific contexts as Galilean physics, chemistry, and physiology. Practical answers 
are offered on the basis of different approaches, among which, in particular, two can 
be singled out. One is made out by what is often called an ‘art’ (thus not a science, 
rather an informed practice) of experiments. From the Renaissance until J.  H. 
Lambert’s writings of the 1750–1760s, we can follow a train of reflections on the art 
of making experiments that deal precisely with the persistence of contingency in the 
matterly objects of pure science. The other is the analysis of contingency in proba-
bilistic terms. They develop subsequently and eventually meet, as it can be seen 
precisely in Lambert’s work: among the first to pursue this path are Jakob Bernoulli 
and Leibniz.
14.1  Introduction
Early modern natural philosophers were, in a way, obsessed with the lofty pessi-
mism of Hippocrates’ ‘ars longa, vita brevis’.1 It was urgent, in their view, to make 
the learning of art quicker through method, while life would be made longer thanks 
to a new science of medicine. But they could have adopted the last part of this apho-
rism as a motto: ‘experimentum fallax, iudicium difficile’, as it sounds in the famous 
1 See for instance Yeo 2014, 91–95.
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1494 Latin rendition.2 Experiment is deceptive and judgement difficult—nature is 
elusive.
Natural objects like birds and stones, salts and acids, seeds and plants, present to 
the early-modern and modern scientific eye a stubborn quality of erraticism: they 
are citizens of an overly populated realm of unpredictability, and, although in some 
respects they obey general laws of nature, in some others they are, in Wallace 
Stevens’ words, “inconstant objects of inconstant cause / In a universe of incon-
stancy” (Stevens 2011, 389).
This unpredictability poses theoretical and practical problems to both natural 
scientists and practitioners that go way beyond the traditional oppositions of stabil-
ity and change, identity and multiplicity, (epistemic) necessity and contingency, and 
other basic metaphysical dichotomies. It is usually perceived as a problem peculiar 
to disciplines based on classification; as a difficulty to be inevitably tackled by the 
founding fathers of certain fields which oscillated in their beginnings between ‘sci-
ence’ and natural history. But it is also, when considered in connection to the issue 
of natural laws laws of nature and of the uniformity of properties pertaining to the 
nature of things, a major problem for experimenters, both in the medical and life 
sciences as well as in more matterly pursuits more concerned with matter, like 
alchemy, and later chemistry. It even grows into an early disturbance in mathemati-
cal physics and mechanics.3
In this last domain, Galileo Galilei was among the first to thematize this matter 
and to sketch some practical answers. When Galileo’s methodological contributions 
are considered, much weight is normally put on his Il saggiatore: a beautiful book 
indeed, and of a kind historians of science relish because of charming quotes on the 
mathematization of Weltanschauung, but also with an excess of general flourishes 
and a strong dose of ‘anything-goes-if-I-am-to-put-Jesuits-down’. One can easily 
sympathize, but might wonder whether Il saggiatore was really so relevant for 
developing scientific Selbstbewusstsein and methodology. Would not scientists read 
Galileo’s Dialogo and Discorsi4 instead? Well, as for our present purpose, it is also 
in these other works that we really find Galileo both enforcing the rule of mathemat-
ics and taking in the contingency of nature.
The first example of such convergence that I have in mind can be found in the 
third day of the Dialogo, where the theme of observational errors in astronomy is 
2 “Vita brevis: ars longa: occasio praeceps: experimentum fallax: iudicium difficile est” (Hippocrates 
1494, a3v).
3 On contingency and laws of nature see chapers. 1, 2, 7 of Daston and Stolleis (2008). On the 
historical evolution of observation as a canonical form of learned experience in late medieval and 
early modern Europe see Pomata and Siraisi (2005), Gaukroger (2006), and chapters 1–3 in Daston 
and Lunbeck (2011). On the context and development of a culture of experimental facts in 16th to 
eighteenth century England, see Shapiro (1979, 1983, 2000). We are considering observation of the 
‘normal’ variability of things; of course ‘monsters’ and ‘wonders’ pose even more complex prob-
lems (see Daston and Park 1998), yet these are outside the scope of this chapter.
4 Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo, tolemaico e copernicano (1632, nine years after 
Il saggiatore); Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove scienze attenenti alla 
mecanica e i movimenti locali (1638).
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raised. Galileo wrote in a letter that he wanted to dispel “Chiaramonti’s blinders” 
(OG 17, 194)5 on novae (in particular that of 1604), which Chiaramonti maintained 
to be sublunar optical phaenomena, thus preserving Aristotelian incorruptibility of 
the skies, and to show the shortcomings in his opponent’s “method in confuting the 
Astronomers, who affirm the new Stars to be superiour to the Orbs of the Planets” 
(Galilei 1661, 253; OG 7, 303).6 It is plain, according to Salviati, that since “the new 
star could not possibly be in many places”, diverging calculations imply “an errour 
in the observations”, and only converging observations might be right, or better 
“may happily be the non-erroneous, but the others are all absolutely false” (Galilei 
1661, 261; OG 7, 313).
Regrettably, observations of the nova are not repeatable, since it disappeared. A 
discussion of Chiaramonti’s method for the choice of the ‘rightful’ group of obser-
vations ensues, introduced by an explanation of the calculation of parallaxes. 
Salviati admits that the combination of a multiplicity of measurements, and of con-
tingencies due to the variety of circumstances, observers and instruments, makes 
errors unavoidable:
for the observations being four in number that serve for one working, that is, two different 
altitudes of the Pole, and two different elevations of the star, made by different observers, 
in different places, with different instruments, who ever hath any small knowledge of this 
art, will say, that amongst all the four, it is impossible but there will be some error (Galilei 
1661, 262; OG 7, 314).
Yet one must not believe, as a disingenuous Chiaramonti appears or pretends to, 
that the magnitudes of relative errors are proportional to the differences in the results 
of measurements, “and that by conversion, from the greatness of the exorbitancies, 
may be argued the greatnesse of the error” (Galilei 1661, 265; OG 7, 317). This 
overlooks the fact that errors in the instrument have a certain proportion to the cal-
culated results.7 The correct procedure to assess the probable accuracy of groups of 
observations is, in the discussed case, rather the opposite:
the greatnesses of the error (to so speak) instrumental, are not to be valued by the event of 
the calculation, but by the quantity itself of degrees and minutes numbred upon the instru-
ment, and these observations are to be called more just or less erroneous, which with the 
addition or substraction of fewer minutes, restore the star to a possible situation; and 
amongst the possible places, the true one may be believed to have been that, about which a 
greater number of distances concurre upon calculating the more exact observations (Galilei 
1661, 265; OG 7, 318).
5 I shall use the following abbreviations: OG = Galilei 1964; A = Leibniz 1923; AG = Leibniz 1989; 
GM = Leibniz 1849; GP = Leibniz 1875; NE  =  Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, 
according to A VI 6; RB = Leibniz 1996, with the same pagination as A VI 6.
6 For the sake at least of testifying to the influence of these works, I shall be using coeval English 
translations of Galileo.
7 “Fix it well in your mind, that in the highest distances, that is v.g. the height of Saturn, or that of 
the fixed Stars, very small errors made by the Observator, with the instrument, render the situation 
determinate and possible, infinite and impossible. This doth not so evene in the sublunary dis-
tances, and near the earth” (Galilei 1661, 265; OG 7, 317).
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This might well be hailed as the inception of the modern theory of errors. An 
appreciation of the genesis of both gross and random errors, as we would call them, 
in observations involving multiple measures, is adroitly connected to a precise anal-
ysis of the proportion between contingent imprecisions due to the measurement 
condition and the magnitude of the true error.
Yet it is in the Discorsi that Galileo focuses on the origin of the uncertainty of 
measurements in the observation of natural events, or of their experimental counter-
parts, and identifies this origin in the numberless multiplicity of contingent circum-
stances, or ‘accidents’. In the first theorem of the fourth day, when discussing 
resistance (impedimento del mezo; OG 8, 275) it is said:
Again, as to the Irregularity proceeding from the Impediment of the Medium, this, we grant, 
is more considerable, and by Reason of its so manifold Varieties can’t possibly be reduced 
to certain Laws: For if we should only consider the Impediment which the Air causes in 
such Motions as we have th[o]roughly examin’d into, we should plainly find it to disorder 
them all, and that after infinite Ways, according as the Figures, Gravities and Velocities of 
the Moveables are infinitely varied (Galilei 1730, 383–384).
A greater velocity will meet with a greater impeding effect of the medium, a fact 
which is more visible in the case of lighter mobiles. Even if, according to the known 
laws of the fall of bodies, a continual acceleration is expected, “yet such will be the 
Impediment of the Air, that the Body will be deprived of any further Increase of its 
Velocity” (Galilei 1730, 384). This circumstance is perceived by Galileo not as an 
object of possible measurement and calculation, but as a hindrance to the correct 
measurement and calculation of the principal object of enquiry:
And inasmuch as these Accidents of Gravities and Figures are subject to infinite Mutations, 
we can come at no certain Knowledge8 concerning them: Wherefore to treat of this Matter 
scientifically, ‘tis requisite to abstract from them (Galilei 1730, 384).
It is easily seen that the mathematical analysis of errors and the abstraction from 
the infinity of accidental circumstances are but two faces of the same coin–forbear-
ance, so to speak, and nonacceptance. That is, the controlled execution of experi-
ments is the only possible countermeasure to the scattered and pervasive variability 
of material objects.
14.2  2.
An urge is born, we may say, that will become open in the eighteenth century, for an 
‘art of experiments’, or ars experimentandi. This expression does not appear imme-
diately in the writings of the natural philosophers but after some time, and it is rare 
and remarkable. Consequently, as I often happen to do with such clauses, it can be 
treated as a symptom: maybe just the symptom of some malaise, and, as hinted by 
its wording, of the desire for an artful cure.
8 In the Italian text: “ferma scienza” (OG, 8, 276).
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For instance, the German astronomer and cartographer Johann Heinrich Müller 
wrote in 1721 a Collegium experimentale, in quo ars experimentandi […] explana-
tur ac illustratur. He plainly defines the art, in traditional guise, as a habit of con-
ducting experiments9: “Ars experimentandi est habitus instituendi experimenta.” It 
is interesting that he shows an awareness that ‘experimentandi’ might sound like an 
awkward neologism and (“ne quis […] vocis novitate offendatur”) he quotes 
Bacon’s De augmentis scientiarum as a previous and authoritative use (Müller 
1721, 1).10 According to Müller, the natural variety of circumstances is mirrored in 
the innumerable ways in which an experimental ‘artificial state’ can be produced: 
“There are innumerably innumerable variations in which the artificial state of every 
natural body subjected to the control of the artificer can be modified”.11 
Correspondingly, in the section devoted to Prolegomena, a unique Axiom concern-
ing experimentation is introduced: “Only under precise conditions and circum-
stances a natural body exhibits and demonstrates what and how much it can act or 
be acted upon”.12
Again, the control of experiments, although it is based here more on methodol-
ogy than on mathematization of procedures, is central in tackling the variety of 
material contingency. But an art of experiments cannot be an affairof pure theory. It 
is true that this expression is connected to a strong methodological commitment; 
nevertheless, it is not difficult to detect in many scientific writers of the time a clear 
awareness also of an intrinsic ambivalence.
Very different, for instance, is the attitude of Thomas Sprat, a clergyman who 
contributed to founding the Royal Society in 1660 and eventually became an 
Anglican bishop. As early as 1667, Thomas Sprat published a History of the Royal 
Society, in which he intended to vindicate the scientific progress they had already 
made,13 and in which a long section was devoted to a “defence and recommendation 
of Experimental Knowledge in general” (Sprat 1667, B4v). Nevertheless, when 
Sprat discusses the “Art of Experiments”, and opposes it to cavilling on arguments, 
he not only maintains that it “consists not in Topicks of reas’ning, but of working”, 
he adds as well that it “indeed is full of doubting and inquiry, and will scarce be 
9 Ars is considered an habitus intellectualis in the whole Latin Aristotelian tradition on the basis of 
Eth. Nic. VI. It is remarkable that, in contrast to Bacon and certain strands of Aristotelianism, the 
pertinent instrument is not a ‘logic’.
10 Although using a not dissimilar definition, the most important contemporary German philoso-
pher, Christian Wolff, is surprisingly deaf to any practical aspect of these issues: for him, very 
simply, “Ars experimentandi est., qua experimentis veritates eruuntur”—i.e. the art in which we 
find truths by means of experiments, as a subdivision of the ars inveniendi a posteriori, in a sort of 
belated Ramist treatment of the ars inveniendi in general (Psychologia empirica, §459; Wolff 
1732, 357–58).
11 “Innumerabiliter […] innumerae erunt variationes, quibus corporum naturalium omnium, potes-
tati artificis subjectorum, status artificialis mutari potest” (Müller 1721, 7).
12 “Corpus naturale non nisi sub certis conditionibus et circumstantiis, quid et quantum agere vel 
pati possit, prodit ac demonstrat” (Müller 1721, 7).
13 Not without a conspicuous, maybe inevitable share of idealizations; see Wood (2009).
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brought to settle its assent”—although, as expectable, this is “such a doubting as 
proceeds on Trials, and not on Arguments” (Sprat 1667, 332).
To remain on Baconian English land, Robert Boyle, the standard-bearer of 
experimental philosophy, has an even clearer insight into the pitfalls of experimen-
tation, which is exemplarily testified by his composing, some years later, an essay 
Of the unsuccessfulness of experiments:
Several observations or experiments […] though communicated for true by candid authors 
or undistrustful eye witnesses, or perhaps recommended to you by your own experience, 
may upon further trial, disappoint your expectation, either not at all succeeding constantly, 
or at least varying much from what you expected (Boyle 1772, I 318–319).
Such disruptions can be looked upon as “the effects of an unfriendliness in nature 
or fortune to your particular attempts, as proceed but from a secret contingency 
incident to some experiments” (Boyle 1772, I, 319).14 To the diversity of these 
‘secret’ contingencies Boyle is very attentive. In the Experimental history of colours, 
for instance, it is correspondingly remarked that “the Fineness or Coarseness of the 
Papers, their being carefully or slightly Colour’d, and divers other Circumstances, 
may so vary the Events of such Experiments as these” (Boyle 1772, I, 726), such 
that only very careful repetition can secure the results. There is a variety of contin-
gent material circumstances affecting the bodies we have experience of, which 
themselves can be made object and source of experimentation: “several bodies, 
which experience assures us imbibe or retain something from the air, as calcined 
minerals, marcasites, salts, factitious and natural, and may be often expos’d to it, 
and then weigh’d again, and farther diligently examined”, as we read in the 
Suspicions about some hidden qualities in the air (Boyle 1772, IV, 97). Experiments 
themselves can be varied accordingly to the variety of circumstances:
experiments may be varied with a good magnet, by exposing it long to the air, in regions 
differing much in climate, foil, or both; by exposing it by day only, or by night, at several 
seasons of the year, in several temperatures of the air, at several considerable aspects of the 
stars and planets, by making it more or less frequently part with what it has gained from the 
air; and in short, by having regard to that variety of circumstances which human sagacity 
will suggest (Boyle 1772, IV, 97).
And “by thus diversifying the experiment many ways”, it becomes possible to 
“make some unexpected, and yet important discovery” (ib.). Mirroring the contin-
gent variety of material conditions in experiments becomes thus both a problem and 
an opportunity, provided that it is absorbed into an art of experiments. Again the 
relation is double-faced, but, in contrast with Galileo, it is not a mathematical theory 
or meta-theory of experiments that is proposed, but a general technique of experi-
mental praxis, in short: again an art of experiments.
14 And it is even more important to “consider the contingencies, to which experiments are obnox-
ious, upon the account of circumstances, which are either constantly unobvious, or at least are 
scarce discernible till the trial be past” (Boyle 1772, I 334). On the role of contingencies and 
experimental miscarriages in Boyle’s scientific programme see Sargent (1994).
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14.3  3.
The common element to all these cogitations from astronomy, physics and chemis-
try, is, as we have seen at length, the contingency of the world of material objects as 
represented by the unruly innumerability of particular elements or circumstances. 
The situation was not any different in the realms of anatomy, zoology, botanythat is, 
in the sciences of the living. Here, though, the issues at stake were amplified by the 
revolution brought about by microscopical observations, with a new infinitely small 
complication of contingent particulars proposing itself as a new object of the life 
sciences. The answer, at least of some prominent scientists, was again to be given in 
the framework of the art of experiments.
With “our Modern Engine (the Microscope)”, enthusiast Henry Power15 would 
write in the 1660s, “you may see what a subtil divider of matter Nature is” (Power 
1664, c2r). Even Adam in his prelapsarian state could not see the satellites of Jove, 
and “so doubtless the Minute Atoms and Particles of matter, were as unknown to 
him, as they are yet unseen by us” (a4v). But the “Experimental and Mechanical 
Philosopher” (194) would be able “to attempt even Impossibilities” (191), and 
indeed,
if the Dioptricks further prevail, and that darling Art could but perform what the Theorists 
in Conical sections demonstrate, we might hope, ere long, to see the Magnetical Effluviums 
of the Loadstone, the Solary Atoms of light (or globuli aetherei of the renowned Des- 
Cartes) the springy particles of Air, the constant and tumultuary motion of the Atoms of all 
fluid Bodies, and those infinite, insensible Corpuscles which daily produce those prodi-
gious (though common) effects amongst us (Power 1664, c3v–c4r).
The work comprised three books and was titled Experimental philosophy. One of 
the books was entirely devoted to microscopical experiments, or experimental 
observations made with microscopes. It is curious, and provides us with a nice 
bridge to the authors we shall consider hereafter, that in the same book Power also 
proposed (albeit very naively) the experimental study of “insensible Transpiration 
in plants” (Power 1664, 29).
It is well-known that ‘Galilean’ approaches were soon applied to the understand-
ing of living bodies. Among the best-known attempts is the study of muscular 
motion attempted by Borelli with the use of geometrical schemes. But if we are 
looking for experimental strategies that tackle, in the domain of observability, the 
multiplicity of minute contingent entities and events, we should bring our attention 
instead to Santorio Santorio, the Istrian physician who taught in Padua and 
befriended Paolo Sarpi, Sagredo, Acquapendente, and maybe Galileo himself. 
Although Santorio wrote his Statica medicina in aphorisms to imitate Hippocrates 
(Santorio 1614, A3r-v), experiments were his forte. The quantification of unobserv-
able particularities has had an important role in medicine since the time of Santorio’s 
15 Henry Power’s experimental philosophy joined “claims for experimental liberty and devotion” 
(Shapin and Schaffer 2011, 304). Power put great weight indeed on experimentation: “the true 
Lovers of Free, and Experimental Philosophy […] are the enlarged and Elastical Souls of the 
world” (Power 1664, 191). See also the still useful Cowles 1934.
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studies of insensible perspiration, which were presented by the author himself as a 
first attempt to submit this invisible process to an experimental enquiry, since all he 
wrote had been corroborated by the use of his famous weighing chair. In the Epistle 
to the Reader he proudly states: “Ego vero primus periculum feci” (Santorio 1614, 
a7v). Periculum means here ‘experiment’, as it is correctly translated in the coeval 
English version:
It is a thing new, and not before heard of, in Medicine, that any one should be able to find 
out the exact weight of insensible perspiration, nor has any one of the Philosophers or 
Physicians attempted the doing of any thing in that part of the medical faculty. I am the first 
who made the experiment, and (if I am not mistaken) brought the Art to perfection, by 
reason, and the experience of 30 years (Santorio 1676, A3r).
Measurement of and dealing with the minute phenomena of living bodies are 
methodically related to experiments in another, equally seminal work that we may 
introduce symmetrically with Santorius’ Statica medicina, that is Stephen Hales’ 
Vegetable Staticks (1727). In the Dedicatory Epistle, Hales declares that his studies 
will show that plants get food not only from the earth, but also from the air, “that 
wonderful fluid […] which by infinite combinations with natural bodies, produces 
innumerable surprizing effects” (Hales 1727, A3r-v). And ‘innumerable’ is the 
buzz-word of this book, where, inside Malpighian-inspired descriptions of the finest 
structures of vegetable organisms, we meet “innumerable fine capillary vessels” 
(149), “innumerable little pores of leaves” (155), “innumerable little vesicles” (345, 
359), “innumerable minute” (244) and “innumerable narrow meanders” (376); 
while “innumerable air-spheres”, and “innumerable bubbles of air” turn out passim. 
Hales also returns a couple of times to the “infinite varieties of combinations of the 
common principles of vegetables” (360) and the “infinite combinations, action, and 
re-action of those principles” (319).
Faced with this explosion of contingencies, Hales explains in the Introduction 
how the natural philosopher should proceed:
Since we are assured that the all wise Creator has observed the most exact proportions, of 
number, weight and measure, in the make of all things; the most likely way, therefore, to get 
any insight into the nature of those parts of the creation, which come within our observa-
tion, must in all reason be to number, weight, and measure. And we have much encourage-
ment to pursue this method of searching into the nature of things, from the great success 
that has attended any attempts of this kind (Hales 1727, 1–2).
Hales points, more precisely, to the success of astronomy and to the most recent 
results in the study of “animal œconomy” (2). The allusion gives a strong experi-
mental tinge to the request for precision and measurement. And in fact, in the 
Preface Hales proposes yet another instance of the conjunction of complicated natu-
ral contingency and artful experimentation that is becoming, I suppose, familiar to 
us:
the wonderful and secret operations of Nature are so involved and intricate, so far out of the 
reach of our senses, as they present themselves to us in their natural order, that it is impos-
sible for the most sagacious and penetrating genius to pry into them, unless he will be at the 
pains of analysing Nature, by a numerous and regular series of Experiments; which are the 
only solid foundation whence we may reasonably expect to make any advance in the real 
knowledge of the nature of things. (Hales 1727, ix–x).
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14.4  4.
It is fairly evident that the two strands I have presented here—one based on the pre- 
condition of abstraction, associated with mathematical procedures of control, and 
the other more attentive to the repetition of experiments and the large scale of exper-
imentation on multiple aspects of the natural world—are not only, as per the subject 
of this chapter, the most qualified answers in early modern science to the contin-
gency of material objects, but also correspond to well-known alternative views on 
experimental science and its development. It is also apparent that the two views 
might be complementary but, in the sources we have used, seem to be independent. 
In the eighteenth century we begin to see—still in conjunction with the appreciation 
of the contingent variability of nature—paths of progressive unification.
An outstanding example in this field in the eighteenth century is the work of 
Johann Heinrich Lambert, in particular in the domain of the measurement of light 
and heat. “Rien de plus difficile, que la mesure de la lumière”: nothing is more dif-
ficult than measuring light, we read in the Foreword to Lambert’s Remarkable prop-
erties of the light path, “when one wants to follow all its modifications and all the 
phenomena it offers us” (Lambert 1758, 6). Two years later he published his 
Photometria, in which he founded a new specialized field of study devoted to the 
measurement of light and illumination.
On the one hand, in both works Lambert’s approach has a strong deductive com-
ponent: starting from certain basic properties axiomatically expressed, he demon-
strates other, non-trivial properties and laws. On the other hand, especially in the 
Photometria, he establishes a complex and innovative experimental apparatus to 
complement, verify and extend his findings. He insists, in particular, on the recur-
sive role of experiments in the training and adjustment of the ‘instrument’, that is, 
the eye. So he writes in the Preface:
I have noted throughout that all photometric experiments still depend on the judgment of 
the eye. So if anyone should repeat that which I have described, and sees it in a different 
way, I am confident that I am not going to be faulted. The acuteness and sensitivity of my 
eyes was explored in experiments I furnished […] and I added the precautions which I used, 
to the extent I was able [quantum in me fuit experimentis exploratam dedi atque insuper 
cautelas adiunxi, quibus usus sum] (Lambert 1760, 5v; 2001, vii).
Lambert repeatedly states, in not-so-different words, that “the precautions must 
be related by which the errors of the eye are to be remedied [cautelae, quibus occur-
rendum est oculi fallaciis]” (1760, §255; 2001, 87). Moreover, he devises specific 
experiments to train and test the eye:
For instance, after having positioned a candle at L and placed a wooden board at D, casting 
a shadow on the entire room by the candle, I stepped back from the wall 10 or 12 feet, and 
then looking at the wall with not only the naked eye but also armed with a concave lens, I 
sought the interval or extent BC, in which the eye could discern no difference in brightness 
which was sensible [in quo nullam deprehendere valuit oculus claritatis differentiam, quae 
sensibilis esset] (Lambert 1760, §265; 2001, 92). [Fig. 14.1].
Lambert also takes into account the familiar dispersion of contingent circum-
stances: “Given a roughness of infinite degree [infiniti asperitatis gradus], reflected 
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and dispersed light are mixed in an infinity of ways” (Lambert 1760, §627; 2001, 
221). But he treats infinite variations of different kinds in different ways. For 
Lambert, to whom infinitesimal calculus and infinite series are available, infinite 
variations and infinite small elements can be treated mathematically. Conversely, 
the infinite variability of experiments cannot be treated with any a priori 
technique:
If the same experiment is repeated several times, with varying circumstances, and the error 
turns out greater or less by reason of the circumstances, either the universal truth of the law 
is to be doubted, or some particular law is to be suspected depending on these circum-
stances (Lambert 1760, §273; 2001, 95).
In accordance with the principle of abstraction from the infinite contingent cir-
cumstances, an ideal manifesto of which we have found in Galileo’s Discorsi, 
Lambert says that we should not calculate in all details every case corresponding to 
a certain problem, but he looks for a different kind of remedy:
Since these cases could be endless, and many of them would have to be pursued by very 
laborious calculation—if in fact you wish to consider all the details and have a reckoning of 
them—it has been proposed to present a certain average one [medium quoddam in his 
tenere] from among these. The details [minutias] themselves we will ignore to the extent it 
will be possible without noticeable error, and we will survey chiefly those cases which are 
more frequent, and which will need to be used for establishing and describing many subse-
quent experiments, and finally we will take care so that the formulas derived are well- 
ordered, so they can more easily be applied in practice (Lambert 1760, §486; 2001, 
170–171, modif.).
The mention of ‘frequency’ patently situates this ‘method’ inside the newly 
founded domain of probabilistic anticipation, that is, inside the process of the for-
malisation of the treatment of conjectures. A conjecture is made – for example, that 
experiments concerning certain cases will be more fruitful – on the basis of fre-
quency records. Briefly stated, then, Lambert appears to be supplementing the ars 
experimentandi with an ars conjectandi, an ‘art of conjecturing’.
In point of fact, so runs the title of one of the founding works of probability 
theory, composed at the beginning of the eighteenth century by Jakob Bernoulli and 
published after his death: a book with which “the story of the emergence of proba-
bility comes to an end” (Hacking 1975, 166). The appropriation of this title for our 
reasoning is somewhat abusive—Nicolas Bernoulli, who edited its posthumous 
publication, wrote that the author’s intent had been to show the importance of this 
Fig. 14.1 Caption AU3
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part of mathematics in civil life.16 Nothing particular concerning natural observa-
tions and experiments was featured in the book, although the collection of experi-
mental data concerning, for example, life expectancy, one of the great themes of the 
early debates on probability, was considered.17
Most of the book dealt with games of chance. The fourth part was expressly 
devoted to the ars conjectandi and had been devised as a continuation of the last 
chapters of Arnauld’s and Nicole’s Art de penser (the famous Logique de Port 
Royal, titled Ars cogitandi in the Latin translations that had appeared since 1674). 
These chapters dealt with certainty and probability in human affairs (“évenemens 
humains”), where no necessary truth is involved, “ces évenemens estant contingens 
de leur nature”18 (Arnauld and Nicole 1981, 339).
Bernoulli has a peculiar and innovative approach: on the one hand, everything in 
the created world is determined and certain in itself (objective et in se)—as it is 
mandatory, one may say, according to mechanistic science as well as rational the-
ology.19 On the other hand, subjective et in ordine ad nos, our knowledge of truths 
concerning the world is ‘certain’ up to a measure. But if this is the case, knowledge 
can be more or less precisely measured, and ‘certainty’ is a mensura cognitionis 
nostrae circa hanc veritatem:
The certainty of anything is considered either objectively and in itself or subjectively and in 
relation to us. Objectively, certainty means nothing else than the truth of the present or 
future existence of the thing. Subjectively, certainty is the measure of our knowledge con-
cerning this truth.20 In themselves and objectively, all things under the sun, which are, were, 
or will be always have the highest certainty (Bernoulli 1713, 210; 2006, 315).
Conjectures based on ‘experiments’ are therefore the backbone in the conclusive 
and fundamental section of Bernoulli’s work. And such conjectures are ruled not by 
weighing the authority of testimonies, but by mathematical rules that concern, first 
of all, the role of frequency. Even some stupidissimus, Bernoulli writes, would rec-
ognize, at least by some natural instinct,
that to judge in this way concerning some future event it would not suffice to take one or 
another experiment, but a great abundance of experiments would be required [magna exper-
imentorum requiratur copia], given that […] the more observations of this sort are made, 
the less danger there will be of error (Bernoulli 1713, 225; 2006, 328).
16 “Propositum fuit Auctori monstrare eximium usum quem in vita civili habet ea. Matheseos pars, 
a paucis hactenus tractata, quæ de probabilitatibus dimetiendis agit” (Bernoulli 1713, n.n.).
17 On the connection of primeval probability theory and such questions of civil and political import 
see Poovey (1998).
18 My italics. This passage (“since such events are contingent by their own nature”) was the only 
appearance of the term ‘contingent’ in the text of the Logique. On the pre-Port Royal and pre-
Pascalian history of rational methods of dealing with uncertainty see Franklin 2001.
19 Plainly for God, and in general for any omniscient being, ‘chance’ does not exist. Incidentally, 
Bernoulli’s first studies had been in theology.
20 This is a first approximation to distinctions that will be crucial in probability theory, to which, 
yet, Bernoulli’s concepts are not perforce to be mapped: “There is no need to foist a single proba-
bility idea on to Bernoulli” (Hacking 1975, 149). On the peculiar way in which both Bernoulli and 
Lambert kept in view non-additive notions of probability see Shafer (1978).
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Bernoulli wants, firstly, to properly demonstrate this natural thing that everybody 
knows. Moreover, he wants to provide a means of calculating the expectation of 
certain outcomes, positive, for example, from the ratio of favorable outcomes in 
series of tests or experimentations – i.e. from what will become the classical mea-
sure of probability. Now this requires him to ask:
Whether, as the number of observations increases, so the probability increases of obtaining 
the true ratio between the number of cases in which some event can happen and not happen, 
such that this probability may eventually exceed any given degree of certainty. Or whether, 
instead, the problem has an asymptote, so to speak […] (Bernoulli 1713, 225; 2006, 328).
Bernoulli was indeed the first to demonstrate a limit theorem in probability the-
ory. He calls favorable cases ‘fertile’, and works with natural numbers and rational 
fractions: if the number of ‘fertile’ and ‘sterile’ cases have, exactly or approxi-
mately, the ratio r/s, fertile cases are to all the cases in the ratio r/(r + s), which 
Bernoulli shortens to r/t,
Which ratio is bounded by the limits (r + 1)/t and (r − 1)/t. It is to be shown that so many 
experiments can be taken that it becomes any given number of times (say c times) more 
likely that the number of fertile observations will fall between these bounds than outside 
them, that is, that the ratio of the number of fertile to the number of all the observations will 
have a ratio that is neither more than (r + 1)/t nor less than (r − 1)/t (Bernoulli 1713, 236; 
2006, 337).
In this way, epistemic probability would be connected in a mathematically 
demonstrative way to the quantitative evaluation of past knowledge (in the form of 
series of tests converging on some value of ‘probability’), although it is manifest 
that the measure of the probability of conjectures would be sourced from an a pos-
teriori evaluation of contingent circumstances.
Let us now get back to Lambert. He considers frequency as the starting point 
and, as a concept (as became customary in the eighteenth century) originally inte-
grated into chance:
Since positive and negative aberrations are equally possible […], it is a consequence that 
they will also be equally frequent [aeque quoque eas fore frequentes] if the experiment is 
repeated many times (Lambert 1760, §277; 2001, 96).
On this basis, some general methods of probabilistic correction and assessment 
of experimental measurements can be developed. For example, the difference 
between the arithmetic mean of all observations, and the arithmetic mean of all but 
the observation most diverging from the first mean is the measure of the uncertainty 
of the series of observations considered, or, in Lambert’s words, how ‘dubious’ it is: 
“quousque dubium est medium ex omnibus invento” (Lambert 1760, §294; 2001, 
101). Plainly, Lambert considers the “quantitas vera determinanda”, the true quan-
tity to be determined (1760, §296; 2001, 102), as something that exists in reality, as 
it was with Bernoulli’s summa certitudo. Yet in principle it is inaccessible, since it 
is impossible to know whether any single experiment gives the ‘true quantity’ as 
result. Consequently, a method is devised that allows the true quantity to be approxi-
mated, if not with absolute certainty, with the greatest probability:
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Since in individual experiments in Photometry, as in countless [infinitis] others, aberrations 
are not equally frequent, another method is provided for determining the mean quantity 
from a finite number of them, so that the probability is greatest that it will differ least from 
the true quantity of them all [ut maxime probabile sit, eam a vera omnium minime discrep-
are]. [Thus] everything should be brought to the highest degree of probability [ad proba-
bilitatem maximam esse perducendam], when absolute certainty in every detail cannot be 
attained (Lambert 1760, §277; 2001, 102 modif.).
14.5  5.
So there must be some point, be it in time or in the sequence of events, at which 
experiments begin to connect to probability. The connecting link might be searched 
for, from the point of view of historiography, in the form of some train of quota-
tions, or of the formulation of a specific doctrine. But the connecting link, in truth, 
is the real-life necessity that had developed in the meantime, and textual manifesta-
tions do but record or mirror—in some cases sooner, in others later—precisely that 
necessity. This having been said, we must add that among the first to express and 
conceptualize these needs with an eye on the development of mathematical tools 
and doctrines, we find, as it is often the case in the 17th and 18th centuries, Leibniz.
In his youth, as a reader of Bacon, of Ramists, and of all kinds of writings on 
method, Leibniz had composed among others a short memoire on an ‘art of finding 
theorems’—that is, propositions of mathematics and of mathematical physics. 
There, an ‘art of experiments’ was also brought to the fore:
Then there is the method of investigation by induction. But, since we are unable to look into 
all the cases, it pertains to the art to choose which shall be considered before the others, and 
this comes down precisely to analogy; therein consists the entire art of experiments.21
This is an art of devising experiments, not of performing or comparing them, as 
becomes clear in the following lines, where we read: “If we are simply looking for 
the experiments that are to be done on a given subject, these will be found by means 
of previous experiments, through analogy”.22 Such self-sufficiency of experiments 
is strictly Baconian. In Bacon’s view, the scattering of natural particularities that we 
have dwelt upon is an opportunity rather than a hindrance, in relation to the knowl-
edge of general laws of nature: “you may see great Axioms of Nature, through small 
and contemptible Instances and Experiments” (Sylva sylv. I, §91; Bacon 1857–1874, 
II, 377). Bacon, moreover, radically pitted probable reasoning against experience: 
erstwhile philosophers, he wrote in one of his customary unfavorable assessments 
of past doctrines in the Preface to Instauratio magna, have “followed only probable 
21 “Superest methodus investigandi per inductionem, sed cum omnia percurrere nequeamus, artis 
est. eligere præ cæteris examinanda, et hoc jam reducitur ad Analogiam; et in eo consistit tota ars 
experimentorum” (A VI, 3, 425).
22 “Sed simpliciter experimenta quaerere dato subjecto, hoc faciendum est., ope jam cognitorum 
experimentorum per analogiam” (A VI, 3, 425).
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reasoning”, while nobody “has spent an adequate amount of time on things them-
selves and on experience” (Bacon 2000, 9). In the Novum organum, §36 ends so: 
“We have deliberately taken quite a long time to deal with [crucial instances], so 
that men may gradually learn the habit of forming judgements of a nature by crucial 
instances and illuminating experiments, and not by probable reasoning” (Bacon 
2000, 168).
Interestingly, a little further in the same text we are quoting from, Leibniz intro-
duces another art, concerned with hypotheses instead of experiments, under a name 
that is again familiar to us:
The art of making hypotheses, or the art of conjectures [ars conjectandi], has different 
kinds: the art of explaining cryptograms pertains to it and is the highest specimen of the 
pure art of conjectures, abstract from matter, from which such rules can be derived that will 
eventually be applied to matter.23
Leibniz seems somewhat to be cognizant of the very same sensitive questions 
that we have singled out in the writing of many relevant early-modern scientists and 
natural philosophers, and, moreover, to have at least a feeling of a connection, rather 
than an opposition, between them. Nonetheless, his way of treating such issues 
seems to bear but a feeble similarity to the path we have been following, and his 
notions, at least in the beginning, stem from a very different approach. This con-
cerns, first of all, his idea of probability.
In Leibniz’s youthful writings we mostly find a “protoconceptualisation 
juridique” (Parmentier 1995, 8) of probability. For a long time, ‘probable’ is taken 
by him in the original sense of likely, verisimilar, plausible, or credible.24 Yet, in his 
view, it is worthy of belief in a measure that can be tested or probed in some way,25 
on the model of the evaluation of witnesses in a trail. It is consilient with this start-
ing point that in 1677 Leibniz equated probable arguments with ‘semi-proofs’.26 
Probability is a property of propositions that, in the framework of a more general 
reformation of logic, should be subject to some sort of dependable and procedural 
assessment, and be metaphorically weighed.27 To move from this to a probabilistic 
appreciation of contingent natural phenomena, however, an important change of 
perspective is needed.
23 “Ars faciendi Hypotheses, sive Ars conjectandi diversi generis est., huc pertinet ars explicandi 
Cryptographemata, quae pro maximo haberi debet specimine artis conjectandi purae et a materia 
abstractae, unde regulae duci possunt quas postea etiam materiae applicare liceat” (A VI, 3, 426).
24 In the terms of Aristotelian tradition, upon which Leibniz so often relies, it is a matter of dialecti-
cal reasoning, instead of demonstrative. Conclusions are not necessary, in this case, but probable, 
basing on, so to say, inconclusive inferences. The distinction is also presented as one “between 
examination of matters of necessity and examination of contingencies” (Jardine 1991, 118).
25 “A gifted mind ignorant of the doctrine of chances but able to apprehend the fact that evidence 
and causation are in different categories could perfectly well start measuring epistemic probability. 
The proof of this is that Leibniz did” (Hacking 1975, 85).
26 “Reasons are either proofs, or presumptions, or semi-proofs (semiprobationes) or probabilities” 
(A VI, 4, 2167; Dascal 2007, 53).
27 Marcelo Dascal has pointed to Leibniz’s frequent use of the word “balance” and its synonyms 
(Dascal 2008, 68–69).
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The knowledge of contingent small things is just as much an object of interest for 
Leibniz as it is for anyone else, if not more,28 and his concept of contingency, 
together with the complex metaphysical framework that underpins it, has been the 
subject of ample literature. For sure this matter is exceedingly intriguing, but has not 
very much to do with our subject here. For Leibniz events and entities are contin-
gent, if they are not ‘of logical necessity’ – that is, if their existence depends princi-
pally on God’s free choice to create a certain possible world (the best of them all, to 
be sure). Contingent events have infinite conditions, since, according to Leibniz, the 
apparent material world is infinitely divided into actual living immaterial beings, 
each one representing the whole universe, past, present, and future, from its point of 
view, and at the same time acting as a center of force. This inexhaustible complexity 
implies that no demonstrative knowledge is possible of a contingent truth, since a 
demonstration is such, according to Leibniz, only if it can be carried through in a 
finite number of steps.
This profound connection between actual infinity and contingency cannot blend 
well, as we shall see, with the study of distributions in series of events governed by 
the law of (finite) great numbers. Most of Leibniz’s texts concerning contingency 
express his satisfaction at discovering the opposition of moral necessity and meta-
physical necessity; the principle of the best on which the choice is based and on 
which moral necessity depends, and the discovery that the ‘root’ of contingency is 
to be found in infinity. Much rarer, yet extant in some quantity, are texts in which 
Leibniz directly confronts this infinity of circumstances in relation to actual knowl-
edge of natural events, processes, and laws:
For instance, whether such-and-such a fixed star is larger or smaller than the sun, or whether 
Vesuvius will erupt in such-and-such a year—knowledge of these facts is beyond us, not 
because they are above reason but because they are above the senses. After all, we could 
judge very soundly about these matters if we had more perfect organs and more information 
as to the facts [plus d’information des circonstances] (NE IV, 17, §23; RB, 493).
When there is not enough information as to circumstances, we might be left with 
mere contingent connections of contingent facts, contingently similar. But these 
connections are the stuff of purely empirical knowledge, which Leibniz regards as 
typical of beasts, of incognizant humans, and of adepts of certain epistemologies, 
for example obstinately ‘empirical’ physicians:
Beasts are purely empirical […] whereas man is capable of demonstrative knowledge [sci-
ences demonstratives]. […] The consequences beasts draw are just like those of simple 
empirics, who claim that what has happened will happen again in a case where what strikes 
them is similar, without being able to determine whether the same reasons are at work. This 
is what makes it so easy for men to capture beasts, and so easy for simple empirics to make 
mistakes (NE, Préf; A VI, 6, 50; AG, 293).
This especially affects “people in civil and military affairs”, when they “rely too 
much on their past experiences” (ib.). Empirics and beasts enjoy but ‘a shadow of 
reasoning’, whereas only reason is capable of establishing sure rules. And since in 
28 May I refer on this to Pasini (2016).
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many instances such rules cannot be established with enough certainty and preci-
sion, what is needed is a new kind of logic dealing with the probable.29
But a proper definition of chance seems impossible, if not in purely epistemic 
(ignorance-based) terms, in Leibniz’s world, where an all-embracing principle of 
reason is unrestrictedly valid—that is, “the great principle, little used, commonly, 
that nothing takes place without sufficient reason, that is, that nothing happens with-
out it being possible for someone who knows enough things to give a reason suffi-
cient to determine why it is so and not otherwise” (GP 6, 602; AG, 209–10). Leibniz 
makes it clear, in §36 of the Monadology, that the infinity of contingent circum-
stances on which we have ruminated since the beginning of this chapter does not 
escape that law:
There must also be a sufficient reason in contingent truths, or truths of fact, that is, in the 
series of things distributed throughout the universe of creatures, where the resolution into 
particular reasons could proceed into unlimited detail because of the immense variety of 
things in nature and because of the division of bodies to infinity (GP 6, 612–13; AG, 217).
In fact, the ‘probability’ that Leibniz most often discusses is still a property of 
statements in terms of credibility, rather than a property of events in terms of expec-
tations.30 His main aim is to provide new instruments, formal and operational, for 
properly assessing testimonies and historical sources. In the Nouveaux essais 
Leibniz insists that an opinion based on likelihood (l’opinion, fondée dans le 
vraisemblable) is a legitimate kind of knowledge, and such is the case, in particular, 
for historical knowledge. Precisely in this context he introduces the theme of 
probability:
I maintain that the study of the degrees of probability would be very valuable and is still 
lacking, and that this is a serious shortcoming in our treatises on logic. For when one cannot 
absolutely settle a question one could still establish the degree of likelihood on the evidence 
[ex datis], and so one can judge rationally which side is the most plausible (NE IV, 2, 14; 
RB, 372).
Leibniz, it can be remarked, keeps here his notion of probability away from the 
more traditional meanings related to persuasiveness. Moralists, he writes, have had 
“an inadequate and over-narrow notion of probability, which they have confused 
with Aristotle’s endoxon or acceptability”. Probability or likelihood is broader than 
plausibility, he adds. Unfortunately, in this passage he just explains the foundation 
of likelihood in the sense that “it must be drawn from the nature of things” (ib.), but 
29 One must agree at least with the second part of this comment: “By ‘a kind of logic’, Leibniz 
means a calculus of probabilities, whose development he foresaw with his usual prescience. […] 
Yet once again, Leibniz overstates the virtues of formalization and its role in practical deliberation” 
(Rolfe Grosholz 2008, 176).
30 To circumvent this problem, some interpreters have invested in what Hacking (1975, 138) called 
“the probability-possibility-facility-creatabilitynexus”, which is a rather weak solution, at least 
because it seems to impose either epistemic or practical limitations on the Creator, or to misread 
important Leibnizian texts (as e.g. in Krüger 1981).
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it is clear, at least, that the basis on which probability should be assessed has to do 
with ‘things’ and ‘data’, that is, it must be tested against knowledge of the world.31
Leibniz knew the work of Pascal, Huygens, and De Witt, who had initiated the 
mathematical study of chance, starting on the one hand from an interest in games 
and the probabilities of different results in the case of unfinished parties, on the 
other hand from the calculus of life expectations based on statistical data, for the use 
of insurances and political economy, of medicine and public health, and of poli-
tics.32 These were indeed analyses, up to some point, of the nature of things, in 
particular of such things that apparently happen by chance.
What of ‘chance’, then, in Leibniz’s view? There are many phenomena of inter-
est, and that can be the object of important knowledge, that Leibniz seems to con-
sider as submitted to chance and fortuitousness. A conspicuous example is provided 
by the peculiarities of native tongues, which do not arise only from a change of 
customs: “le hazard y a aussi sa part”, there is a role for chance as well (NE II, 22, 
§6; A VI, 6, 214). In historically developed languages, there is a combination of 
‘nature’ and ‘chance’, hazard: this is because root words are formed not only by 
chance, but “sur des raisons physiques”, on physical grounds as well (NE III, 2, §1; 
A VI, 6, 278 and 281). Moreover, when striking similarities and common roots are 
found between different natural languages, it is not chance that will be searched for, 
but reasonable historical explanations, such as the effects of commerce and migra-
tions: “on ne le sauroit attribuer au seul hazard, ny même au seul commerce, mais 
plustost aux migrations des peuples” (ib.).
Sometimes Leibniz even deals with ‘coincidences’, also considered as the effect 
of ‘chance’.33 And he is confronted with the concept of ‘chance’ in probability the-
ory, when reading Jan de Witt’s Waerdye van Lyf-Renten (Valuation of Life Annuities, 
1671) in the autumn of 1683. In the margin of his notes, Leibniz remarks: “I sup-
pose that Kansse, or expectative in Dutch, comes from the French chance. In 
German I would say Schanße, like when they say ‘to lose or forfeit a chance’”.34 
Thus he does not immediately connect ‘chance’ with casual distributions of equi-
31 This allows him to negate any special role of the “opinion of weighty authorities”, which can 
contribute to the likelihood of an opinion, but “does not produce the entire likelihood by itself” 
(NE IV, 2, 14; RB, 373) as regards the nature of things. For instance, Copernicanism was decidedly 
likely even when Copernicus was isolated in his opinion.
32 On Leibniz’s attentiveness to these matters see Leibniz (1995, 2000), Cussens (2004), Mora 
Charles and Sol de (1992), Parmentier (1999), Rohrbasser and Véron (2001, 2002), Schulenburg 
and Thomann (2010).
33 “I have been assured that a lady at a well-known court saw in a dream the man she later married 
and the room where the betrothal took place, and she described these to her friends, all before she 
had seen or known either the man or the place. This was attributed to some secret presentiment or 
other; but chance could produce such a result since it happens rather rarely; and in any case the 
images in dreams are a little hazy, which gives one more freedom in subsequently relating them 
with other images” (NE IV, 11, §11; RB, 445).
34 “Kansse oder expectative hollandisch, puto esse ex Gallico chance germanice exprimerem 
Schanße, wie man sagt die schanße verlieren oder verscherzen” (A IV, 6, 705).
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probable events,35 but in the idea of the opportunity for an event to take place there 
is an implicit hint in that direction.
Huygens was well aware of this ambiguity of probability and so, in his analysis 
of games of chance, he preferred to discuss ‘expectations’ (in the sense of legitimate 
objective expectations of gamblers). The word Leibniz prefers, in order to express 
this aspect, is apparence, appearance:
Now, since all these reasonings are based on reasonable appearances [des apparences rai-
sonnables], it is timely to explain, first of all, what is an appearance and how it should be 
estimated. I say that the appearance is nothing else but the degree of probability: e.g. a dice 
like those used to gamble has six equal sides, and so the appearance is equal for each side. 
(A IV, 3, 457).
This definition is followed up by a rule for finding ‘mean appearances’ (‘Regle 
pour trouver les moyennes apparences, aux quelles il se faut arrester dans 
l’incertitude’). Do just like the peasants do, Leibniz intimates: have three groups of 
estimators of the value of a good, and take the mean value of their estimates. This 
proceeding, he adds, “est fondé en raison demonstrative” (A IV, 3, 458), which 
means, among other things, that it can be submitted to logic, as we have seen that 
Leibniz, in his maturity, consistently maintains. In particular it can be submitted to 
an especially innovative branch of his already innovative universal logic, or charac-
teristica universalis. The new branch of logic devoted to the degrees of probabili-
ties, then, would be of the kind he always had in mind: a formal logic, an ‘art of 
characters’. This he had written, for instance, to Princess Elizabeth in 1678:
In order to reason with evidence in all subjects, we must hold some consistent formalism 
[formalité constante]. There would be less eloquence, but more certainty. But in order to 
determine the formalism that would do no less in metaphysics, physics, and morals, than 
calculation does in mathematics, that would even give us degrees of probability when we 
can only reason probabilistically, I would have to relate here the thoughts I have on a new 
symbolic analysis [characteristique], something that would take too long. (A II, 1, 666; AG, 
239, modif.)
Of course the ‘calculation’ of a degree can be performed in many different ways 
and Leibniz seems to be thinking of some kind of direct measure. Possibly he is 
thinking of a set of criteria, and of rules for the composition of values corresponding 
to the composition of sentences.36 In a way, nevertheless, it also had to be a proper 
calculus, a set of mathematical devices, since “the degrees of probability or likeli-
35 A pioneer of the study of lotteries, Gataker, admitted that the word ‘chance’ could by some be 
“utterly condemned, and held foolish and heathenish”, yet it was a term “according to the iust 
analogie and proportion of Tongues and Languages, used by the Holy Ghost himselfe in Gods 
booke both in the Old and New Testament” (Gataker 1627, 9–10). On him see Daston (1988, 155).
36 As it is hinted at by, for example, this passage: “The question of how inevitable a result is, is 
heterogeneous from—i.e. cannot be compared with—the question of how good or bad it is. […] 
The fact is that in this as in other assessments which are disparate, heterogeneous, having more 
than one dimension (so to speak), the magnitude of the thing in question is made up proportion-
ately out [en raison composée] of two estimates […] As for the inevitability [grandeur] of the 
result, and degrees of probability, we do not yet possess that branch of logic which would let them 
be estimated” (NE II, 21, § 67; RB, 206–7).
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hood in conjectures or proofs” are capable of an estimation “as sure as that of num-
bers [aussi asseurée que les nombres]” (A VI, 4, 689).
For Leibniz, ‘logic’, ‘calculus’, and ‘formal argument’, are very broad notions 
and comprise very disparate ways of proceeding:
The entire form of judicial procedures is, in fact, nothing but a kind of logic, applied to legal 
questions. Physicians, too, can be observed to recognize many differences of degree among 
their signs and symptoms. Mathematicians have begun, in our own day, to calculate the 
chances [les hazards] in games (NE IV, 16, §9; RB, 465).
Here hazard and its laws are, on the one hand, sheer constructs, since there is no 
real ‘chance’ in Leibniz’s universe, as we have seen. On the other hand, in epistemic 
terms they can be the essential theoretic components of the pure analytic modelling 
of a possible situation, like that of the dice with the equal ‘appearance’ for each side. 
How far, then, can modelling answer the problem of evaluating contingencies, natu-
ral and practical?
It is telling that, when confronted in 1703 with Jakob Bernoulli’s first attempts at 
mathematizing the art of conjectures, Leibniz immediately sees there “a difficulty”, 
that is, “that contingencies, i.e. those things which depend upon infinite circum-
stances, cannot be determined through a finite number of experiments”. Things 
change and, day in, day out, new illnesses appear: “who can state whether the next 
experiment will not depart from the law that all the former ones have followed?”37
It is Leibniz’s usual mistrust of induction,38 together with his usual enthusiasm 
for the infinite inexhaustibility of every parcel of creation, that makes him recoil at 
the thought of his friend Bernoulli’s great-numbers laws. To this general attitude, a 
formal demonstration of the inevitable and inexhaustible variability of reality, and 
even of its analytical representations, is added:
Given any number of points, it is possible to find infinite geometric lines that pass through 
them. I demonstrate it so. I postulate (and it can be demonstrated) that given any number of 
points, a regular line can be found that passes through them.39 Suppose that it is found, and 
let us call it A. Now take another point in the same region, but such that does not belong to 
that line: let a line pass through both the formerly given points and the new point, which is 
made possible by the same postulate. By necessity this will be a priori a different line, and 
yet it will pass through the same points through which the former one passed. Since points 
37 Leibniz to Jacob Bernoulli, Dec 3, 1703: “Difficultas in eo mihi inesse 84 videtur, quod contin-
gentia seu quae ab infinitis pendent circumstantiis, per finita experimenta determinari non possunt 
[…] quis dicet, an sequens experimentum non discessurum sit nonihil a lege omnium praeceden-
tium? ob ipsas rerum mutabilitates. Novi morbi inundant subinde humanum genus” (GM 3, 
83–84).
38 “That is why geometers have always held that what is proved by induction or by example in 
geometry or in arithmetic is never perfectly proved”; even “if one tried a hundred thousand times, 
[…] one can never be absolutely certain of this unless one learned the demonstrative reason for it, 
something mathematicians discovered long ago. […] In fact, there are experiments that succeed 
countless times, and ordinarily succeed, yet in some extraordinary cases we find that there are 
instances where the experiment does not succeed” (GP 6, 504–5; AG, 190).
39 This idea (that depends much on the definition of a ‘regular’ line) returns often in Leibniz’s writ-
ings, together with the optimistic notion that all curves can have an analytical expression: see for 
example §6 of the Discours de métaphysique (A VI, 4, 1537–1538).
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can infinitely vary, more and more lines will be possible, up to infinity. Now these points 
can be compared to the observed instances, and the regular line can be compared to the rule, 
or estimation, that is drawn from those instances.40
In fact, Leibniz’s idea was that, with his desired logic of probability we would 
not be entitled to certainty—that would be the same as pretending to demonstrate 
some truth by induction—but to a reasonable preference between opposing appear-
ances, as he had written 1 year before to Queen Sophie Charlotte:
But the force of the demonstrations depends upon intelligible notions and truths, which 
alone are capable of allowing us to judge what is necessary. In the conjectural sciences they 
are even capable of demonstratively determining the degree of probability, given certain 
assumptions, so that we may reasonably choose, among opposing appearances, the one 
which is most probable. But this part of the art of reasoning has not yet been developed as 
much as it should be (GP 6, 504; AG, 189).
Now that a tentative foundation of this part of the art of reasoning has been pre-
sented to him, he writes to Bernoulli explicitly: “The estimation of probabilities is 
of the utmost utility, yet in juridical and political matters what is needed is not some 
subtle calculus, but rather an accurate enumeration of all circumstances.”41 Jacob, 
after a short-lived display of patience, answers in his customary uncompromising 
style:
That the theory of the estimation of probabilities in juridical matters comprises not only the 
enumeration of circumstances, but this very reasoning and calculus as well, that we usually 
employ in comparing the lots of players, this is something that I have been taught by the 
various enquiries on insurances, on life rents, on dotal pacts, on presumptions, and still 
others.42
He proposes then to Leibniz an example that is intended to show him the corre-
spondence between abstract reasoning and contingent natural reality. Just as, by 
numerous repeated extractions, there is an increasing probability of determining the 
unknown ratio of white and black pebbles in an urn, so by numerous repeated obser-
vations it is possible to determine with the necessary precision the frequency of ill-
nesses in human individuals:
40 “Datis quotcunque punctis inveniri possunt lineae infinitae per ipsa transientes. Quod sic demon-
stro: Postulo (quod demonstrari potest) datis quotcunque punctis inveniri posse lineam aliquam 
regularem, per ipsa transeuntem. Inventa illa esse ponatur et sit A. Sumatur jam aliud punctum 
inter data, sed extra hanc lineam; et per puncta initio data et punctum novum transeat linea, quod 
fieri potest per idem postulatum: hanc necesse est. esse diversam a priori, at tamen per eadem 
transire puncta data, per quae prior. Et cum punctum infinities variari possit, etiam aliae atque aliae 
in infinitum lineae erunt possibiles. His autem punctis comparari possunt casus observati et lineae 
regulari regulae seu aestimationes ex casibus ducendae” (GM 3, 84).
41 “Utilissima est. aestimatio probabilitatum, quanquam in exemplis juridicis politicisque 
plerumque non tam subtili calculo opus est., quam accurata omnium circumstantiarum enumera-
tione” (GM 3, 83).
42 “Quod Doctrina de probabilitatibus aestimandis in materiis juridicis non sola circumstantiarum 
enumeratione, sed eodem illo ratiocinio et calculo indigeat, quo alias in sortibus aleatorum com-
parandis uti solemus, docent me variae quaestiones de Assicurationibus, de Reditibus ad vitam, de 
Pactis dotalibus, de Praesumtionibus, aliaeque” (GM 3, 87).
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Now, if you replace the urn with a human body, that be the body either of an old or of a 
young man, this body contains in itself the source of illnesses like the urn contains the 
pebbles, and you can determine in the same way, by observations, how much closer to death 
the former man is than the latter.43
If new illnesses should appear, then it would simply be required to institute new 
observations and experiments. This is, then, Bernoulli’s conclusion:
The ratio between the numbers, albeit infinite, of illnesses, can be determined by a finite 
amount of experiments, indeed without complete accuracy, yet so much as it is needed in 
practice, approximating nearer and nearer, until the error becomes negligible.44
Did Jacob Bernoulli manage to convince Leibniz? In any event, in the Nouveaux 
essays, which Leibniz composed between 1704 and 1705, we encounter this deci-
sive overture:
I have said more than once that we need a new kind of logic, concerned with degrees of 
probability, since Aristotle in his Topics could not have been further from it […] Anyone 
wanting to deal with this question would do well to pursue the investigation of games of 
chance (NE IV, 16, §9; RB, 466).
14.6  5.
It may be remarked that conjectures on natural phenomena assessed with cutting- 
edge mathematical tools were also a way to go beyond, or leave behind the debates 
on Cartesian ‘hypotheses’.45 Emilie Du Châtelet, the socialite turned scientist who 
delivered the best translation ever of Netwon’s Principia Mathematica, who pro-
posed relevant insights on the estimation of forces and kinetic energy, and wrote 
some of the best pages on scientific methodology after Bacon himself, was among 
the first to rehabilitate hypotheses in natural science after Newton’s anti-Cartesian 
offensive. The enabling instrument, so to speak, for the recovery of hypotheses was 
the evaluation of degrees of probability:
Since hypotheses are only made in order to discover the truth, they must not be passed off 
as the truth itself, before one is able to give irrefutable proofs. So it is very important for the 
progress of the sciences not to delude oneself and others with the hypotheses one has 
invented, but one should estimate the degree of probability in a hypothesis [estimer le degré 
de probabilité qui s’y trouve]. (Du Châtelet 1740, I, 89; 2009, 152).
43 “Quod si nunc loco urnae substituas corpus humanum senis aut juvenis, quod fomitem morbo-
rum in se velut urna calculos continet, poteris eodem modo determinare per observationes, quanto 
ille quam iste morti sit vicinior” (GM 3, 88).
44 “Rationem inter numeros morborum etsi infinitos determinare possumus finitis experimentis non 
praecise, sed quantum ad praxin sufficit accedendo subinde propius donec error insensibilis fiat” 
(GM 3, 91).
45 See nonetheless McClaughlin (1996) for an investigation of French Cartesian empiricism.
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Hypotheses, then, “are only probable propositions that have a greater or lesser 
degree of certainty,46 depending on whether they satisfy a more or less great number 
of circumstances attendant upon the phenomenon that one wants to explain by their 
means.” Hypotheses would finally become truths, “when their probability increases 
to such a point that one can morally present them as a certainty” (Du Châtelet 2009, 
154). This is a noteworthy point, on which we shall conclude this chapter.
Jacob Bernoulli’s Ars conjectandi ends with the unexpected surfacing, from the 
deep pools of frequentist probability and the law of great numbers, of a vindication 
of universal determinism, associated by Bernoulli with ‘apocatastasis’—the final 
‘restitution’ or ‘re-establishement’ of all things—the two doctrines being drawn 
together under the possibly inappropriate banner of Platonist philosophy.47 From 
what has been demonstrated, in fact,
at last this remarkable result seems to follow, that if the observation of all events were con-
tinued for the whole of eternity (with the probability finally transformed into perfect cer-
tainty) then everything in the world would be observed to happen according to precise 
proportions and under constant laws of alteration (certis rationibus et constanti vicissitudi-
nis lege): so we would have to admit a sort of necessity and, so to speak, fatality, even in the 
most casual and fortuitous things. I do not know whether or not Plato already wished to 
assert this result in his dogma of the universal return of things to their former positions, in 
which he predicted that after the rolling of innumerable centuries everything would return 
to its original state (Bernoulli 1713, 239; 2006, 339, modif.).
It is not devoid of interest that the same notion of a universal return of all things 
to the initial conditions, as an ἀποκατὰστασις πὰντον, had been since the late 1690s 
the object of several short writings of Leibniz’s.48 The bases for Leibniz’ treatment 
were not probabilistic, but rather combinatorial, allowing him to conclude a priori 
what follows:
If the human kind continued for long enough, the time would necessarily come when noth-
ing would be said that had not been already said before. But it is not certain that a time will 
come when nothing can be said that has not been said before. For it could happen that cer-
tain things were never said, even through all eternity. […] But suppose that 1 day nothing 
could be said that had not already been said before, then there must also be a time when the 
same events reoccur and when nothing happens which did not happen before, since events 
provide the matter for words (Leibniz 1991, 59; Coudert 1995, 113, modif.).
A similar result, in the last writing dedicated to such speculations that Leibniz 
composed in 1715, is produced by a simple demonstration of the finiteness of all 
possible written descriptions of any interval of time in the history of the universe, so 
46 In the first edition, instead of certitude, Du Châtelet (1740, I, 86; 1742, I, 91) wrote probabilité.
47 On the historical development of the doctrine of apocatastasis from its Stoic origins to Christian 
adaptations see Ramelli 2013. Bernoulli (1713, 53; 2006, 177) had also been using the term in a 
weaker sense, for the return of the lots to their original states in a game continued for long enough 
(apocatastasis sortium).
48 There is some Origenism in the background of these discussions, that saw Leibniz debate with 
people like Petersen and Overbeck on the theme of universal renovation and salvation; see Costa 
2014.
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that Leibniz, in the draft of this last take of his on “apocatastasis”, wrote that, if the 
demonstration were true,
if the human kind continues in its present state for long enough, a time will come when even 
single lives would repeat themselves in minute detail, and in the same circumstances: I 
myself, for instance, would return to live once again in the city called Hanover, on the banks 
of the river Leine, once again busy studying the history of the Brunswick house, and writing 
to the same friend letters with the same content (Leibniz 1991, 64).
But the demonstration is not applicable to the real vicissitudes of creation. As we 
have seen, contingent events, according to Leibniz, are governed by infinity: actu-
ally infinite circumstances enter in the constitution of the smallest parcel of the 
created universe. This richness corresponds to divine wisdom: the creator has pro-
duced nothing uniform, nothing monotone, and diversity marries plenitude in the 
whole of nature. That infinity likewise ensures the well-known fact that there exist 
no distinct indiscernible objects in Leibniz’s world, and thus also the repetition of 
identical events is made impossible by the same element—divine wisdom and 
choices of necessity only moral—by which the contingency of the world is granted.
Lambert’s answer, not many years later, to what might be called Bernoulli’s par-
adoxum apocatastaticum, would be much simpler: cum vero nullum experimentum 
infinities repetatur, “since no experiment can be repeated infinitely,49 what can be 
deduced from a finite number of experiments must be considered instead” (Lambert 
1760, §280; 2001, 96, modif.). Thus, we might say, the appreciation of contingency 
that was becoming the privileged object of the art of conjectures would be saved, 
once again, by a most basic principle of the ars experimentandi.
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